Abstract. In response to various cryptanalysis results on white-box cryptography, Bringer et al. presented a novel white-box strategy. They propose to extend the round computations of a block cipher with a set of random equations and perturbations, and complicate the analysis by implementing each such round as one system that is obfuscated with annihilating linear input and output encodings. The improved version presented by Bringer et al. implements the AEw/oS, which is an AES version with key-dependent S-boxes (the S-boxes are in fact the secret key). In this paper we present an algebraic analysis to recover equivalent keys from the implementation. We show how the perturbations and system of random equations can be distinguished from the implementation, and how the linear input and output encodings can be eliminated. The result is that we have decomposed the white-box implementation into a much more simple, functionally equivalent implementation and retrieved a set of keys that are equivalent to the original key. Our cryptanalysis has a worst time complexity of 2 17 and a negligible space complexity.
Introduction
In the past decade, we have witnessed a trend towards the use of software applications with strong security requirements. Consider for example online banking and digital multimedia players. Building blocks to enable their security include cryptographic primitives such as the DES or the AES [13] . However, these building blocks are designed to be secure only when they are executed on a trustworthy system, which is typically no longer a valid assumption. White-box cryptography aims to address this issue -it aims to implement a given cryptographic cipher such that it remains 'secure' even when the adversary is assumed to have full access to the implementation and its execution environment (the white-box attack context). We refer to a white-box implementation as an implementation of a cipher to which these techniques are applied.
At SAC 2002, Chow et al. introduced the concept of white-box cryptography, applied to the AES [5] , and to the DES in [6] . The main idea is to generate a network of re-randomized lookup tables that is functionally equivalent to a key-instantiated primitive. However, subsequent papers have shown that this strategy is prone to differential cryptanalysis [10, 11, 9, 16] and algebraic cryptanalysis [2, 12, 15] . In [1] , Billet and Gilbert proposed a traceable block cipher, by implementing the same instance of a cipher in many different ways. The security is based on the Isomorphisms of Polynomials (IP) problem [14] . Unfortunately, analysis of this IP problem [8] has defeated this approach. Based on the idea to introduce perturbations to reinforce the IP-based cryptosystems [7] , Bringer et al. [3] reinforced the traceable block cipher, and presented a perturbated whitebox AES implementation [4] . The main idea of the perturbated AES white-box implementations is to extend the AES rounds with a random system of equations and perturbation functions. The perturbations introduced at the first round are canceled out at the final round with a high probability; to guarantee correct execution, several such instances need to be implemented such that a majority vote can reveal the correct result. The random system of equations is discarded in the final round. As a challenging example, they apply their technique to the AEw/oS -a variant of the AES with non-standard, key-dependent S-boxes. These S-boxes are in fact the secret key. To the best of our knowledge, no attack against this white-box AEw/oS implementation has been proposed so far.
Our contribution. We developed a cryptanalysis of the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation; which extends naturally to perturbated white-box AES implementations. In a white-box attack context, the adversary will have access to each of the (obfuscated) rounds -these consist of the composition of random linear input and output encodings, the AES round operation with key-dependent S-boxes, and encompass the random system of equations and perturbated functions. The presence of the (unknown) linear encodings and the extra equations makes it hard to recover the secret information -the S-boxesfrom the implementation.
In this paper, we describe the structural analysis of the white-box AEw/oS round operations. We show how to derive a set of equivalent S-boxes and linear encodings that describe a functionally equivalent implementation (due to the construction of the implementation, there are many candidate keys). As a result, we obtain a significantly simpler version of the white-box AEw/oS implementation, which is also invertible, thus defeating the security objective of the original implementation. Our cryptanalysis has a worst time complexity of 2 17 and a negligible space complexity.
Organization of the paper. To support the cryptanalysis description, in Sect. 2, we present an overview of the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation as presented by Bringer et al. [4] . The cryptanalysis comprises three main steps, which are presented in Sect. 3.
In this section, we describe the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation, which is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [13] with non-standard Sboxes -the choice of S-boxes is in fact the secret key, and there are 160 of them comprised in the entire implementation. Fig. 1 depicts the implementation, where X is the plaintext input, Z r are the intermediate states (outputs of the perturbated round functions R r ), where Z 10 is the final output.
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In this section, we describe the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation, which is the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) [13] with non-standard Sboxes -the choice of S-boxes is in fact the secret key, and there are 160 of them comprised in the entire implementation. Fig. 1 depicts the implementation, where X is the plaintext input, Z r are the intermediate states (outputs of the perturbated round functions R r ), where Z 10 is the final output. The perturbated round functions. Each round R r of the perturbated AEw/oS is expressed as a system of 43 multivariate polynomials over GF 2 8 ; the final round as a system of 16 multivariate polynomials. Each system is defined over 43 variables (bytes), except for the initial round, which is defined over the 16 bytes of the plaintext. These extra variables and equations are due to the extension The perturbated round functions. Each round R r of the perturbated AEw/oS is expressed as a system of 43 multivariate polynomials over GF 2 8 ; the final round as a system of 16 multivariate polynomials. Each system is defined over 43 variables (bytes), except for the initial round, which is defined over the 16 bytes of the plaintext. These extra variables and equations are due to the extension of the AES rounds with a perturbation system of 4 polynomials and a system of 23 random polynomials Ran r . The latter is introduced to dissimulate the perturbation and mask all internal operations.
The perturbation initialization systemΦ is included in the first round R 1 and comprises of 4 polynomials that "often" take the predefined value (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 , ϕ 4 ) and is constructed asΦ(X) = (0(X) + ϕ 1 ,0(X) + ϕ 2 ,0(X) + ϕ 3 ,0(X) + ϕ 4 ), where the0-polynomial "often" vanishes. Linear Encodings (M r ) 1≤r≤9 . Annihilating linear input and output encodings M r over GF 2 8 between successive rounds ensure that all the variables are interleaved to make analysis hard -e.g. to prevent that an adversary is able to distinguish the system of random equations from the original functionality. These encodings M r can be represented as a 43 × 43 diagonal block matrix constructed as follows:
where (1) the A (l) r | l=1,...,7 are random invertible 5 × 5 matrices of which the inverse has exactly 2 non-zero coefficients in GF 2 8 on each row; (2) B r is a random invertible 8 × 8 matrix of which the inverse has at least 7 non-zero coefficients in GF 2 8 on each row; and (3) π r and σ r are random permutations at byte level of {1, . . . , 43} defined such that the matrices A (l) r | l=1,...,7 mix the 16 original polynomials with 19 random polynomials, whereas B r mixes the 4 perturbation polynomials with the remaining 4 random polynomials. We refer to [4] for determination of the constraints on the matrices. Our cryptanalysis exploits these characteristics of the linear encodings M r .
Obtaining the Correct Result. Due to the introduction of the perturbation in the first round, there is a probability that the ciphertext is incorrect (wheñ Φ(X) = (ϕ 1 , ϕ 2 , ϕ 3 , ϕ 4 ) and thus Y 2 10 = O Φ (Φ(X)) = 0). Therefore, four correlated instances of the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation are generated. Each with a different perturbation function, constructed such that there are always two instances that give the correct result (ciphertext) while the other two result into different random values with an overwhelming probability. A majority vote can then be used to distinguish the correct result. We refer to [3, 4] for a discussion on the correlation of the four 0-polynomials. Our cryptanalysis requires only one instance of the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation.
Summary. Putting everything together, the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation consists of four instances of implementations with different perturbations; each instance comprising of 10 rounds R r , defined as follows:
for R r | 2≤r≤9 , where I is the identity function ,
Along the specifications of Bringer et al. [4] , each instance accounts ≈142 MB, which brings the full size of the white-box implementation to ≈568 MB.
Cryptanalysis of the White-box AEw/oS Implementation
In this section we describe our cryptanalysis, which comprises of the following three steps:
1. Analysis of the final round: distinguish the system of random equations and the perturbations from the AEw/oS round operations, and recover the input encoding M
−1 9
up to an unknown constant factor s.t. the linear equivalent input of the original final round R 10 can be observed. 2. Separate the output bytes of the S-boxes: eliminate the MixColumns operation from the penultimate round R 9 s.t. the unknown factors of the linear equivalent output of R 9 can be included into the secret S-boxes. 3. Full structural decomposition, i.e. recovering all linear input/output encodings up to an unknown constant factor and eliminating the MixColumns operation within all rounds. Recover linear equivalent key-dependent S-boxes.
Note that not all the information of the secret S-boxes and linear mappings can be extracted since there are many equivalent keys which yield the same white-box implementation. Indeed, we can multiply the input/output of an Sbox with a fixed constant and compensate for it in the adjacent linear mapping. Our attack recovers an equivalent key, and hence the decomposed implementation can for example be used to decrypt arbitrary ciphertexts although the implementation was only intended to encrypt plaintexts.
Setup. Choose a random 16-byte plaintext X, encrypt it with the four correlated implementations, and select one of both instances that result into the correct ciphertext (using the majority vote). For that instance, store the intermediate and final states Z i | i=1,...,10 (which are clearly readable in a white-box attack context), where the final state equals the ciphertext, i.e. Z 10 = Y
Analysis of the Final Round
The first phase of our cryptanalysis focuses on the perturbated final round R 10 , which is lossy since the system of random equations is discarded. We will recover a significant part of the linear input encoding, i.e., the first 16 rows of the linear input encoding M ,i is denoted by (z 9,i1 , z 9,i2 ).
In a white-box attack context, the adversary has access to the description of the (obfuscated) system of polynomials, and is able to manipulate the internal states. Hence, he can freely choose to modify bytes of Z 9 and observe the corresponding output Z 10 . In this context, we present an algorithm to obtain the following sets:
S Z9 (y 1 10,i ): the set containing the pair of intermediate bytes (z 9,i1 , z 9,i2 ) corresponding to each output byte y 1 10,i of R 10 . Due to the lack of the MixColumns step in the final round, R 10 comprises of 16 one-to-one monovariate polynomials, and hence these sets can easily be assigned to the corresponding input byte y of O Φ . This set contains at least 7 and at most 8 bytes.
4
The setup of the algorithm is to generate for each output byte z 10,i | i=0,...,15 of the perturbated final round R 10 a set S Z9 (z 10,i ) consisting of those intermediate bytes of Z 9 which influence z 10,i . Repeat the following steps for each intermediate byte z 9,i of Z 9 one at a time:
Step 1: Make the intermediate byte z 9,i active by introducing a non-zero difference ∆z 9,i ∈ GF 2 8 \ {0} while keeping all other bytes of Z 9 fixed to their initial value (∀l = i : ∆z 9,l = 0); 4 Since B9 mixes the 4 perturbation polynomials with 4 random polynomials, the 8-byte output of B −1 9
consists of the 4-byte input Y 2 9 of OΦ and the other 4-byte output is discarded in the perturbated final round R 10 , hence we only focus on Y matrix), we are only able to identify 7 bytes.
Step 2: Compute R 10 and observe its output Z 10 by comparing with the stored initial final state Y 1 10 (ciphertext): if the number of affected output bytes z 10,i is larger than 5 bytes, then assign the current active intermediate byte z 9,i directly to the set S Z9 (O Φ ). Else z 9,i is assigned to each set S Z9 (z 10,i ) of the output bytes z 10,i it affects. In case that the number of affected output bytes is zero, z 9,i is assigned to no set. Fig. 2 depicts the effect of one active intermediate byte z 9,i on the output bytes of Z 10 and explains the different cases. are 5 × 5 invertible matrices. This trivially translates to a maximum of 5 affected ciphertext bytes due to the lack of the MixColumns step in R10 and accordingly to a maximum of 5 affected output bytes z10,i in Z10. So the case there are more than 5 affected output bytes z10,i only occurs when the active byte z9,i influences the input Y to form the ouput Z 10 , the probability that the number of affected output bytes z 10,i is 5 or less is given by
76 . This corresponds also with the probability that z 9,i is faulty assigned to each set S Z9 (z 10,i ) of the affected output bytes z 10,i (false positive).
Hence, at the end, the probability that each set S Z9 (z 10,i )| i=0,...,15 contains exactly the pair of intermediate bytes (z 9,i1 , z 9,i2 ) generating the corresponding input byte y such that z 9,i1 • c i,1 + z 9,i2 • c i,2 = y 1 9,i , where • denotes multiplication in the Rijndael Galois Field [13] . In this step, we recover both coefficients up to an unknown factor α 9,i , which enables us to observe the linear equivalent input byte α 9,i • y 10 (see note above) -where the relevant input bytes (z 9,i1 , z 9,i2 ) are fixed to their initial value in Z 9 , and (2) find another pair of values (z 9,i1 , z 9,i2 ) by fixing z 9,i1 = z 9,i1 + '01' and searching for z 9,i2 which yield the identical output byte in Z 10 . Hence, since equal output bytes means equal input bytes for R 10 ,
from which we can derive that c i,1 = ε i • c i,2 , with ε i = z 9,i2 + z 9,i2 .
By assigning '01' to c i,2 , only the linear equivalent input byte y 1 9,i can be recovered, i.e. α 9,i • y 1 9,i = ε i • z 9,i1 + z 9,i2 with α 9,i unknown. As a result, we retrieve an expression of the first 16 rows of the linear mapping M . . .
where L 9,i denotes the i-th row of M .15] is all '00' except an ε i and '01' on the relevant columns, i.e. the columns corresponding to the pair of intermediate bytes (z 9,i1 , z 9,i2 ).
Separate the S-boxes
As a result of the first phase of the cryptanalysis, the adversary is able to derive the input bytes y 1 9,i of the original final round R 10 up to unknown coefficients α 9,i , i.e. Λ 9 Y 1 9 . Due to the annihilating nature of the linear encodings between successive perturbated rounds, this also corresponds to the linear equivalent output of the preceding, penultimate round R 9 . Therefore, R 9 can be expressed as
where the set {S 9,i }| i=0,...,15 represents the 16 different invertible 8-to-8 bit original S-boxes of R 9 , which together with the round key K 8 are part of the secret key.
The objective in this step of our cryptanalysis is to include the unknown factors of the linear equivalent output of R 9 into the secret S-boxes by separating the output bytes of the S-boxes, which can be achieved by eliminating the MixColumns operation from the round. However, due to the presence of the unknown values in Λ 9 , this is not trivial since the MixColumns step is an invertible linear transformation which operates on four bytes. We address this problem in this section.
The main idea is to search for a transformation such that the matrix Λ 9 has the same factors α for each four bytes of a MixColumns operation. Even though this factor remains unknown, such a diagonal matrix can be swapped with the MixColumns operation (multiplication with a diagonal matrix with all the same elements is a commutative operation in the group of square matrices). As a result, the MixColumns operation is the final operation and can be eliminated by multiplying the result with the inverse MixColumns operation.
In total there are four parallel MixColumns steps MC i | i=0,...,3 since each step MC i operates on the output bytes of four different S-boxes. Accordingly, Λ 9 can be divided into four 4 × 4 diagonal submatrices Λ 9,i , each containing those unknown factors α corresponding to the four output bytes of each MC i : Λ 9,i = diag(α 9,i , α 9,i+4 , α 9,i+8 , α 9,i+12 ) for i = 0, . . . , 3. Hence out of the requirement Λ 9,i • MC i = MC i • Λ 9,i , we seek a 4 × 4 diagonal matrix Λ 9,i = MC
This is the case when all diagonal entries of Λ 9,i are identical, e.g. Λ 9,i = diag(α 9,i , α 9,i , α 9,i , α 9,i ), and moreover Λ 9,i = Λ 9,i . Here we present an algorithm -which has been successfully implemented in C++ and confirmed by computer experiments -such that:
Given black-box access to the structure as shown in (2), a white-box adversary is able to ensure that all diagonal entries of Λ 9,i become identical and hence construct Λ 9,i = diag(α 9,i , α 9,i , α 9,i , α 9,i ) for each of the four parallel MixColumns steps MC i | i=0,...,3 such that (2) becomes:
Since in (3) the ShiftRows step is just a permutation on byte level, the unknown diagonal entries in Λ 9 can be included into the secret S-boxes by applying the inverse ShiftRows step. (2)) one at a time active and observing the corresponding active output bytes in Λ 9 Y 1 9 (the output of (2) Repeat the following steps for each MixColumns step MC i | i=0,...,3 :
Step 1: Given the initial unmodified value of the intermediate state Z 8 , store the corresponding 4-byte output of
Step 2: Modify one byte in S Z8 (MC i ) and store the corresponding 4-byte output of MC i in Λ 9 Y 1 9 , denoted by Y MCi . In the case when less than three bytes between Y MCi and Y MCi have become active and hence at least three of the four input bytes of MC i have become active, 6 we discard this case and continue with Step 4;
Step 3: Given the pair (Y MCi , Y MCi ), keep the first factor α 9,i fixed while varying the other three factors (α 9,i+4 , α 9,i+8 , α 9,i+12 ) over GF 2 8 \{0} by multiplying the second, third and fourth byte within both values (Y MCi , Y MCi ) with respectively β, γ, δ ∈ GF 2 8 \ {0}. 
MCi )), and construct the following solution set by comparing both values:
Step 4: Repeat Step 2 and Step 3 for each byte in S Z8 (MC i ) one at a time;
Step 5: At the end, a solution set S has been constructed for each modified byte in S Z8 (MC i ). The triplet (β, γ, δ) i for MC i is derived as the intersection between all solution sets.
As can be observed in Step 3, the algorithm only keeps track of single and double active input bytes 7 to each MixColumns step for each modified byte in S Z8 (MC i ) and each combination (β, γ, δ) j . When modifying one byte in S Z8 (MC i ), we distinguish the following two cases:
1. one or two of the four input bytes of MC i have become active. The resulting solution set S obtained in Step 3 is considered valid and contains the triplet (β, γ, δ) j for which the same one or two bytes have become active between (Y (j)
), which only occurs when the triplet made all diagonal entries of Λ 9,i identical (i.e. all equal to α 9,i ) such that Λ 9,i could be swapped with the MixColumns step MC i . This triplet is contained within all valid solution sets; 2. at least three of the four input bytes of MC i have become active and the case has not been discarded in Step 2. Hence the resulting solution set S obtained in Step 3 is considered invalid.
Hence, in
Step 5 only one intersection occurs between all solution sets, i.e. between valid sets since there is no intersection with invalid sets. The triplet (β, γ, δ) i as outcome of the above algorithm applied to each MC i are the factors needed to ensure that all diagonal entries of Λ 9,i become identical to the first factor α 9,i , i.e. diag('01', β i , γ i , δ i ) • Λ 9,i = diag(α 9,i , α 9,i , α 9,i , α 9,i ) = Λ 9,i . So by multiplying each set of four rows corresponding to each MC i of the recovered submatrix M −1 9 [0..15] (see (1) ) with the derived quartet ('01', β i , γ i , δ i ), the adversary is able to construct Λ 9 in which the diagonal entries corresponding to each MC i are identical:    
where
= diag(α 9,0 , α 9,1 , α 9,2 , α 9,3 ). The obtained submatrix of (4) is denoted by M −1
7 Keeping track of double active input bytes is necessary due to the special case mentioned in the setup of the algorithm.
Decomposing the Rounds
The final phase of our cryptanalysis presents the full decomposition of the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation and shows how to obtain a set of candidate S-boxes (the secret key). We present an algorithm to recover all remaining linear encodings up to a constant factor and to eliminate the MixColumns operation, when applied to all perturbated intermediate rounds R r | 2≤r≤9 from the bottom up. We refer to App. A.2 for a detailed description of each step, which are very similar to the ones stated in Sect. 3.1 and 3.2. However, the algorithm for separating the MixColumns step from the S-boxes applied to the first round R 1 , i.e. the case when r = 2, is simplified since the perturbated round R 1 lacks an input encoding.
As a result of the algorithm mentioned above, the white-box adversary has black-box access to the following structures of each round R r | r=1,...,10 :
where each set {S r,i }| i=0,...,15;r=1,...,10 represents the 16 different invertible 8-to-8 bit original S-boxes of R r , which together with round keys K r | r=0,...,10 are part of the secret key. By altering Λ r | r=1,...,9 , its order with the ShiftRows step can be reversed, i.e.
where D i r denotes the matrix D r = diag(α r,0 , α r,1 , α r,2 , α r,3 ) whose diagonal entries are cyclically shifted i-times to the right. Note that the first and final rounds respectively lack a linear input and output encoding.
Although all components in the S-boxes of (6) 
Conclusion
In this paper we presented a structural cryptanalysis of the perturbated whitebox AEw/oS implementation, presented by Bringer et al. [4] . Our attack has a worst time complexity of 2 17 and negligible space complexity (see App. B). Our In the structures of (5), only the ShiftRows and MixColumns steps are known to the adversary. Since all unknown linear bijections Λ −1 r | r=1,...,9 and Λ r | r=1,...,9 are 16×16 diagonal matrices, the unknown factors α as diagonal entries can easily be included into respectively the input and output of the secret S-boxes. Hence the linear equivalent key-dependent S-boxes, denoted by S r,i , have the following form for each round R r | r=1,...,10 :
Although all components in the S-boxes of (6) . In order to vary the input, we keep one of the pair bytes z r−1,i1 fixed and vary the other byte z r−1,i2 . Fig. 3 depicts an overview of the full decomposition of the perturbated whitebox AEw/oS implementation in order to obtain an invertible, functionally equivalent version.
In this paper we presented a structural cryptanalysis of the perturbated whitebox AEw/oS implementation, presented by Bringer et al. [4] . Our attack has a worst time complexity of 2 17 and negligible space complexity (see App. B). Our cryptanalysis trivially extends to perturbated white-box AES implementations as well.
The technique decomposes the obfuscated round structure of the white-box implementation. After eliminating the system of random equations and perturbations, we show how to distinguish the output bytes of individual S-boxesby eliminating the MixColumns from the round functions. This elimination step is crucial in our cryptanalysis, and a proof of concept has been implemented in C++. From the obtained structure, a definition for each S-box can be derived. These S-boxes are linear equivalent to the original (secret) key that was chosen to construct the implementation. Indeed, there are several candidate keys possible that yield the same white-box implementation. This is embodied by the factors α that we meet in our cryptanalysis -these can take any value in GF 2 8 \ {0}. Each equivalent key consists of 160 bijective key-dependent 8-bit S-boxes, which can be used to construct a simpler, functionally equivalent version of the white-box AEw/oS implementation (as depicted in Fig. 3 in Sect. 3.3) . The S-boxes occupy a total storage space of ≈ 41 kB; hence the total size of the implementation is significantly reduced from several hundred MB to just a few tens of kB. On top of this, the implementation becomes invertible, which renders it useless for many practical implementation where white-box cryptography would be of value.
The cryptanalysis is independent of the definition of the perturbation functions that are introduced in the first round; we exploit the characteristics of the input/output linear encodings and some properties of the AEw/oS block ciphers (such as the MixColumns operation). Modifying some specifications in an attempt to mitigate our cryptanalysis, such as the number of non-zero elements on the rows of the A (l)−1 r may turn the white-box implementation useless (its size will increase exponentially).
Although our cryptanalysis is specific to the particular structure of the implementation, some algorithms are of independent interest. In particular for research in structural cryptanalysis. Future research may include research to extend these algorithms to more generic constructions, e.g., where the MixColumns operations are also key dependent. The probability that only one collision occurs, equals (
In the worst case, i.e. when |S ∩ Z9 (z 10,i )| = 10, the probability becomes ≈ 0.84 . Hence it is assumed that the algorithm succeeds in the worst case with only 1 or 2 additional triplets. 
. Hereby, the diffusion property of the MixColumns step is lost and hence there is again a oneto-one correspondence between single active input and output bytes, which is the ShiftRows step. Now we describe each step of the algorithm: Eliminate the MixColumns step in the preceding round R r−1 . The algorithm to convert Λ r−1 into Λ r−1 in which the unknown diagonal entries corresponding to each MixColumns step MC i | i=0,...,3 are identical s.t. the order between Λ r−1 and the MixColumns step can be reversed, is identical to the one applied to the penultimate round R 9 in Sect. 3.2. However there is one special case, i.e. to generate Λ 1 when applied to the first round R 1 . In contrast to all intermediate rounds, the first round lacks a linear input encoding, and thus it is possible to make only one of the four input bytes to the i-th MixColumns step MC i active by modifying the corresponding byte in the plaintext X. So for r = 2, each set S X (MC i ) contains exactly four plaintext bytes. Moreover, when constructing the solution sets S in Step 3 for each modified plaintext byte in S X (MC i ), the algorithm only needs to keep track of single active input bytes. This simplifies the algorithm and increases the performance in this special case.
As a result, we recover the new submatrix M 
B Complexity
The time complexity of our cryptanalysis is expressed in the number of perturbated round evaluations (parsing system of equations over GF 2 8 ). With respect to the round operations, other computations in the attack are negligible and have been ommitted for simplicity.
-Setup phase of the cryptanalysis: encryption of one randomly chosen plaintext by all four correlated instances of the perturbated white-box AEw/oS implementation requires 4 · 10 round executions; -Analysis of the final round: construction of both sets S Z9 (y 1 9,i ) and S Z9 (O Φ ) for the final round needs (1) without the worst case scenario 43 round evaluations or (2) with the worst case scenario -which occurs with a negligible probability -an additional 2·(8·4·10+43+2·5· This brings the total worst time complexity down to 80493 = 2 16 .2966 perturbated round evaluations.
The space complexity of our cryptanalysis is negligible.
